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A FORK IN THE ROAD: ISSUES
SURROUNDING THE LEGALITY OF
MANDATORY CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
ABTRACT
Recently, federal circuit courts have presented contrasting outcomes
regarding the legality of mandatory class action waivers in arbitration
agreements. More specifically, these outcomes vary on whether such waivers
violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), and importantly, whether it is possible for these
statutes to coexist with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Second, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits have previously held that the act of an employer
requiring employees to sign class action waivers in arbitration agreements
posed no violation to either the FLSA or the NLRA. However, in May 2016,
the Seventh Circuit created a circuit split, finding that the waivers in these
agreements did in fact violate both statutes. This Note argues that the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis is correct, and focuses on how the other circuits failed to
give proper deference to the FAA. Further, this Note suggests that Congress
enact a statute requiring the creation of internal dispute departments within
all companies, or alternatively, to amend the FAA to properly address and
protect the rights of employees in these circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
For many years, federal circuit courts have struggled with the issue of
whether an employer requiring his or her employees to sign a waiver barring
them from bringing class action lawsuits, and further, prohibiting the
litigation of an individual action by any means other than that of arbitration
violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). 1 Several factors are taken into consideration when
analyzing this issue, such as an employee’s right under the FLSA to proceed
with class action litigation, 2 the interest of an employer to arrange for
litigation by means of arbitration, 3 and the issue of uniformity and cohesion
between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) with the NLRA and the FLSA. 4
Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s May 2016 holding in Lewis v. Epic Systems
Corporation, 5 all other circuit courts that have rendered decisions on this

1. See N. Peter Lareau, Seventh Circuit Creates Circuit Split on NLRB’s D.R. Horton Decision,
16-8 BENDER’S LAB. & EMP. BULL. 2 (2016).
2. See generally 29 U.S.C § 216(b) (2012).
3. See Amelia W. Koch et al., Individualizing the FLSA: Collective Action Waivers and the
Split in the Federal Court, 13 J. FED. SOC’Y. PRAC. GRP., Oct. 2012, at 99–100.
4. See Lareau, supra note 1.
5. See generally Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
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matter—the Fifth, Eighth, and Second Circuits—were in agreement that
these waivers did not violate the NLRA. 6
This Note examines why the Seventh Circuit has correctly ruled on this
matter, and contends that these waivers do indeed violate the NLRA and the
FLSA because not enough deference was given to the legislature’s intent
when forming the FAA. 7 Part I of this Note will consist of a general overview
of the history of class action waivers in arbitration agreements, as well as
examples of a few United States Supreme Court cases, which exemplify the
permissibility of these arbitration agreements.8 Part II will provide a
breakdown of the NLRA, 9 the FLSA, 10 and the FAA, 11 as these three pieces
of legislation play a crucial role in the analysis of the circuit courts’ holdings.
Part III will provide a summary of the history and the current role arbitration
plays in corporations. Next, Part IV will furnish a detailed analysis of the
circuit split at issue, and address the weaknesses in the holdings from the
Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. Lastly, Part V will suggest that Congress
enact a statute that would require (with a heightened focus on publicly traded
corporations) the creation of internal dispute departments within all
companies, 12 as well as call for an amendment to the FAA to more adequately
address the rights of employees in these circumstances. 13
I. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
The term “class action litigation” refers to the process of one individual
commencing legal action on behalf of oneself, as well as all other similarly
situated individuals. 14 From the perspective of an employer, class action
litigation can lead to catastrophic and irreparable damage within a
company. 15 Needless to say, there is a substantial difference in a claim
brought by just one employee/plaintiff, in comparison with a claim brought
by hundreds, or possibly even thousands of employees/plaintiffs against a
single employer. 16 Thus, employers’ incentives to implement waivers
6. See Lareau, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health

Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070–71 (2013).
9. See generally 29 U.S.C §§ 151–169 (2012).
10. See generally id. § 201.
11. See generally 9 U.S.C §§ 1–3 (2012).
12. See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory
Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of Their Rights 23 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper
No. 414, Dec. 7, 2015), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/#epitoc-15.
13. See id. at 25.
14. See generally Irving M. Geslewitz, Class Action Waivers: Should Employers Be Adopting
Them in Their Employment Agreements?, MUCH SHELIST (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.muchshelis
t.com/knowledge-center/article/class-action-waivers-should-employers-be-adopting-them-theiremployment-agr.
15. See generally id.
16. See generally id.
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requiring single-employee litigation through arbitration revolve around
factors such as litigation cost and exposure, the inability of a plaintiff to
undergo a trial by jury, the benefit of selecting the arbitrator, and the
reduction of time spent litigating in court. 17
A brief example explaining the detrimental effects of a class-action
waiver in an arbitration agreement provides an introduction to one of the
focal points of this Note, that is, an employee’s uphill battle when faced with
this situation. In Patricia Rowe P.A. v. AT&T, Inc., 18 the plaintiff purchased
telecommunication
services
from
AT&T
and
BellSouth
Telecommunications. 19 The contract for the services contained an automatic
renewal clause, and through that provision, the plaintiff, as well as other
similarly situated individuals, was charged an early cancellation fee of
$600. 20 Alleging that AT&T’s early termination fee was fraudulent, the
plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. 21 In response, AT&T, without arguing the merits of the complaint,
contended that the plaintiff was not permitted to bring this action in court,
and rather, was required to submit all claims to binding arbitration. 22
Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, it turned out that a clause in the original service
contract had stated the following: “[b]y signing or indicating acceptance, I
acknowledge and accept all terms of the Agreement as set forth above,
including all terms set forth in the ‘Service Agreement, Service Descriptions
and Price Lists’ found at http://cpr.bellsouth.com/bst/product_line.htm.” 23
Sure enough, there were two clauses on the site that were problematic for
the plaintiff’s argument. 24 The first clause stated that the method of dispute
resolution was independent arbitration. 25 The second clause stated the
following: “[b]y applying for, subscribing to, using, or paying for the ordered
service, you agree to be bound by the charges, terms, and conditions set forth
in this agreement. If you do not agree with the provisions of this agreement,
do not use the services and cancel this agreement immediately. . . .” 26
Ultimately, the District Court granted AT&T’s motion to compel
arbitration. 27 The plaintiff ended up conceding and paying the $600

17. See generally id.
18. See Rowe v. AT&T, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-01206-GRA, 2014 WL 172510, at *1 (Dist. S.C. Jan.

15, 2014).
19. Id.
20. See id. at *3.
21. See id. at *1.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at *2.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at *9.
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termination fee, as she could not afford to individually arbitrate the case. 28
This is just one example where a class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement diminished the plaintiff’s chances of receiving adequate relief for
her injuries.
Arbitration poses certain risks for both sides of the litigation, such as the
extremely limited ability to appeal the arbitrator’s decision, and the tendency
for arbitrators to permit entry of certain evidence that a judge would not
otherwise prohibit. 29 In a study entitled, “Comparison of Outcomes of
Employment Arbitration and Litigation,” Alexander J.S. Colvin created a
dataset that compared the results of employment actions brought by
arbitration to those by litigation. 30 Colvin broke down the study into two
categories: “mean time to trial” and “employee trial win rate.”31 “Mean time
to trial” analyzed the average amount of days involved in arbitrating an
employment action, in comparison to litigating the action in federal or state
court. 32 Additionally, “employee trial win rate,” just as it sounds, compared
the likelihood of a plaintiff succeeding in their action, by means of
arbitration, federal court actions, and state court actions. 33
In terms of the “mean time to trial,” the results of the study 34
demonstrated that the average length of time for mandatory employment
arbitration actions was 361.5 days, whereas litigation in both federal and state
court was over 700 days. 35 As one can see, the average time required to
litigate an action is significantly greater than the average time it takes to settle
an action through arbitration. Furthermore, regarding the “employee trial win
rate,” mandatory employment arbitration results were 21.40%, federal court
actions were 36.40%, and state court actions were 57%. 36 Thus, plaintiffs had
a significantly greater chance of success by means of litigation, as opposed
to arbitration. These statistics highlight just how detrimental arguing a
dispute by means of arbitration can be for an employee, considering the
“employee win rate” in federal court actions is almost double that of
arbitration, and the employee win rate for state court actions is almost triple. 37
28. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arb
itration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0.
29. See Geslewitz, supra note 14.
30. See generally Stone & Colvin, supra note 12, at 20.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. It is worth mentioning that another category analyzed in this study was “median damages,”
which compared the average amount of damages an employee would receive through an arbitration
action to both federal and state court actions. The findings for this category were $36,500 for
arbitration actions, $176,426 in federal court actions, and $85,560 in state court actions. Clearly, the
damages are significantly greater when an employee litigates in either federal or state court, in
comparison to arbitration. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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Theodore Eisenberg implemented a similar study in 2015, which
provides for a more up-to-date look on the differences between arbitration
and federal court litigation. 38 Within these findings, the employee win rate
had dropped from 36.40% to 29.70% in federal court, and arbitration actions
experienced a drop as well, going from 21.40% to 19.10%. 39 These updated
statistics show that although a plaintiff’s chance of success in an employment
action has decreased in both categories, there is still about a 10% greater
chance of success when litigating an employment action in federal court as
opposed to arbitration. 40 Needless to say, there is a visible explanation for an
employer’s desire to require legal action by arbitration, and at the same time,
an arguably inherent unfairness from the perspective of an employee.
Interestingly enough, the United States Supreme Court has already ruled
on the permissibility of employers’ collective action waivers in arbitration
agreements. In June of 2013, the Supreme Court decided both Am. Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 41 and Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter. 42 In the
former case, merchants entered into an arbitration agreement providing for a
class action waiver with both American Express and its subsidiary. 43
Nonetheless, the merchants filed a class action suit against petitioners, at
which point petitioners presented a motion to compel individual arbitration
in light of the waiver. 44 Although the Second Circuit held that it would cost
each merchant more money to pursue individual claims than they would
receive through arbitration, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that, “[t]he
FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class
arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.” 45
In Sutter, the parties entered into a contractual agreement that provided
that a physician would administer medical care to individuals in possession
of this specific insurance. 46 Both parties agreed that, should any problems
arise, an arbitrator would decide on the issue of whether the parties’
contractual agreement called for collective arbitration. 47 The physician
brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of other physicians who were equally
affected when the insurer allegedly failed to make certain payments, and as
per the parties’ prior agreement, an arbitrator decided that the contract did, in
fact, allow for class arbitration. 48 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision,
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 19.
See id.
See id.
See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
See generally Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2306.
See id.
See id.
See generally Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064.
See generally id.
See generally id.
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finding that under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, courts are not permitted to
interfere with the decision of an arbitrator when said arbitrator is within his
or her power to consider a contract and interpret its intent. 49
In light of these two holdings, the Supreme Court’s stance on the matter
of class action waivers in arbitration agreements is clear—that is, class action
rights must be explicitly waived in order to prevent the possibility of an
arbitrator deciding that the true intentions of the parties stated otherwise. 50
Although certain aspects of class action waivers have been settled, the issue
still remaining is whether employees can be required to sign such arbitration
agreements that demand waiver of one’s right to a class action lawsuit, as
said issue has yet to reach the United States Supreme Court. 51
II. A BREAKDOWN OF THE NLRA, FLSA, AND FAA
Before diving into the depths of our circuit split, it is crucial to understand
the purposes and basic overviews of the NLRA, FLSA, and FAA. While all
three pieces of legislation are referenced throughout the circuit courts’
decisions, the crux of the dilemma that the circuit courts are struggling with
is whether there is room for the NLRA and FAA to exist cohesively amongst
one another. 52 The pertinent sections of each piece of legislation are
presented in this section.
A. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 29 U.S.C. § 201
Congress’s underlying intention for passing the FLSA in 1938 was, “. . .
to achieve uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work
or employment engaged in by employees covered by the Act.” 53 The section
of the Act that covers damages, rights of action, attorney’s fees and costs,
and the termination of rights of action is the section at issue for the purposes
of the split. 54 Under Section 216, any employers’ contract that is required to
comply with FLSA, and nevertheless incorporates inconsistent provisions
into its agreement, is rendered illegal and nonbinding on the employee. 55
Specifically, Section 216(b) states that “[a]n action to recover the liability . .
. may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State Court
of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 56 This speaks
directly to an employee’s right to bring a class action suit. 57 More
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See generally id.
See generally id.; see also Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304.
See generally Lareau, supra note 1.
See id.
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944).
See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012).
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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specifically, there is nothing within the statute prohibiting claims by means
of arbitration. 58
B. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, primarily “to protect the rights of
employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail
certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the
general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.” 59 Section 7,
entitled “Rights of Employees,” states that, “[e]mployees shall have the right
to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 60 Additionally, Section 158,
entitled “Unfair Labor Practices,” states that it is contrary to fair labor
practice for employers, “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7.” 61
C. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–3
The FAA “provides the legislative framework for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards in the United States.” 62 Initially,
the FAA’s enforcement power only reached arbitration agreements in the
realm of commercial disputes, but has since been held to extend to
employment disputes as well. 63 At issue in this circuit split is the “Saving’s
Clause,” in Section 2 of the Act, which provides that an agreement that calls
for the resolution of any issues by means of arbitration, “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” 64
III. ARBITRATION AND CORPORATIONS
Over the years, there has been a development within the corporate
practice of employing mandatory arbitration agreements into contracts with
both employees and customers. 65 As mentioned previously, given the
benefits to arbitration, employees do not at first recognize the ominous cloud
that the agreements cast on the ability to protect many of their own
employment rights such as privacy, family leave, and protection against
58. See generally id.
59. NLRB, NAT’L LAB. REL. ACT, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act

(last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
61. Id. § 158.
62. Claudia Salomon & Samuel de Villiers, The United States Federal Arbitration Act: A
Powerful Tool for Enforcing Arbitration Agreements and Arbitral Awards, LATHAM & WATKINS
LLP (Apr. 17, 2014), https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/the-us-fed-arbitration-act.
63. See Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action
Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1015–18 (2013).
64. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 63.
65. See Stone & Colvin, supra note 12, at 3.
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unjust discrimination, all of which are guaranteed by federal statutes. 66
However, the real trouble for an employee working for a major corporation
begins to stir when a class action waiver is coupled with an arbitration
agreement. 67 These class action waivers became popular in the 1990s, and by
1999, ten major banks 68 had formed what was known as “the Arbitration
Coalition,” to publicize and promote the employment of class action waivers
in arbitration agreements. 69
Importantly, unlike an arbitration clause in a contract formed between
two businesses, where the terms of the contract are negotiated at the
discretion of both parties entering into the agreement, arbitration clauses in a
contract between an employer and employee are usually located in the fine
print of a contract, or within the company’s orientation materials. 70 Naturally,
this makes it much less likely that an employee would 1) understand the
extremity of the grip said agreement will have on the duration of their
employment, and 2) that said employee would even notice the existence of
the clause at all. 71 Moreover, many of the practices involved in an arbitration
proceeding 72 ultimately place the corporation in a greater position of power
and leave the employees in an extremely defenseless state in terms of the
arbitrator’s decision, as well as through the questionable practices that are
implemented throughout the course of the proceeding. 73
Some states have tried to pass legislation in an attempt to protect
consumers and employees from unreasonable arbitration agreements, as well
as to try to trigger the “Saving’s Clause” of the FAA and invalidate the
arbitration agreement at issue. 74 The Supreme Court, however, has struck
down these efforts when the sole purpose of the state’s law is to govern the
validity of arbitration agreements in contracts and not contracts generally. 75
For example, in 1985, Montana’s legislature enacted a statute, 76 which
compelled employers to include their arbitration agreement in the first page
of their contracts with consumers, in a reasonably sized font that would
provide the other party with adequate notice. 77 Importantly, corporations
66. See id.
67. See id. at 4.
68. These banks include American Express, Citibank, First USA, Capital One, Chase, and

Discover. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 4–5.
72. Examples include the absence of a jury, the admissibility of evidence that would otherwise
be excluded in a court proceeding, and the fact that the arbitrator is normally a lawyer, not a judge.
See id. at 5.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 8.
75. See id.
76. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1989) (originally enacted as MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-5-114(3) (1985)) (repealed 1997).
77. See Stone & Colvin, supra note 12, at 8.
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were at the forefront of the legislature’s focus when enacting this statute
because of their tendency to provide minimal notice or attention, or lack
thereof, to the fact that such a clause was even included in the terms of the
contract in the first place. 78 In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 79 a
Subway franchise owner and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Casarotto, brought suit
in Montana State Court, alleging that Subway caused them to lose their life
savings and their business to fail when Subway denied them a previously
promised preferred business location. 80 The defendant, Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. (DAI), argued that the litigation should be dismissed, as per the
arbitration agreement included on page nine of the contract between the
parties. 81 The issue before the Montana State Court was whether or not
Montana’s law, which rendered arbitration agreements as null and void
unless “notice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration” is “typed in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract,” invalidated this
contract, as per the “Saving’s Clause” in Section 2 of the FAA. 82 The FAA’s
“Saving’s Clause” declares written arbitration agreements as “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” 83 Essentially, the Montana State
Court had to decide whether Montana’s law qualified as one that would
trigger the application of the “Saving’s Clause,” thereby invalidating the
arbitration agreement. 84 DAI successfully demanded arbitration of these
claims at the trial level; however, the Montana Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the Montana statute rendered this arbitration agreement as null
and void, because the arbitration clause in this agreement was neither
presented in the first page of the contract, nor was the writing underlined or
in capital letters. 85 Thus, in light of the fact that the requirements of the state
statute had not been met, the dispute amongst the parties was no longer
subject to arbitration. 86
This dispute ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court, which
reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s holding. 87 First, the Supreme Court
stated that the lower court incorrectly relied on two prior Supreme Court
cases, Southland Corp. v. Keating 88 and Perry v. Thomas. 89 In Southland
Corp., the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the FAA applies to both state
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 8–9.
See generally Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
See Stone & Colvin, supra note 12, at 8.
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683.
Id.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683.
See id. at 684.
See id.
See id. at 689.
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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and federal courts, and “withdr[aws] the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration.” 90 Further, in its Perry decision, the Supreme
Court reinforced the following notion:
State law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does
not comport with [the text] of § 2. 91

To clarify, in both of these precedent cases, the Supreme Court reasoned
that a state’s law rendered an arbitration agreement unenforceable as per the
“Saving’s Clause” in Section 2 of the FAA, if and only if, the purpose of the
law was to govern the legitimacy of a contract in general.92 The Supreme
Court was not referring to statutes enacted by state legislatures that were
executed for the sole purpose of governing the validity of arbitration
agreements. 93 Thus, since Montana’s law was strictly enacted to govern the
validity of arbitration agreements within contracts, federal law preempted the
state statute. 94 This is one of the many examples of a state’s attempt to
provide increased protection to its employees and consumers against the
overwhelming power of corporations to implement unfair policies into their
contracts, and the Supreme Court’s ultimate rejection of the argument that
the FAA can be undermined by state law specifically written for the purposes
of arbitration agreements. 95
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The following subsections summarize the circuit split at issue, beginning
with an analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s holding, followed by summaries of
the Fifth, Eighth, and Second Circuit opinions.
A. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
In Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 96 the Seventh Circuit, for the first time,
agreed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and held that the
preference for arbitration in the FAA did not trump Section 7 of the NLRA,
which protects collective legal processes. 97 Additionally, the court held that
Section 8 of the NLRA renders any contract provision that prevents an
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10, 12.
Perry, 482 U.S. at 493.
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686.
See id.
See id. at 688.
See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
See id. at 1151.
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employee from seeking class action relief unenforceable. 98 Epic Systems
(Epic) is a healthcare software company that compelled its employees to
agree to bring any wage or hour claims that they may have against the
company solely by means of individual arbitration. 99 The employees were
not required to sign a written agreement; rather, the company stated that
employees manifested acceptance if they continued to work at Epic. 100 Jacob
Lewis, an employee, had agreed to the terms of the arrangement; however,
after his involvement in a dispute with Epic, Lewis chose to file his suit in
federal court, claiming that Epic’s denial of his overtime pay was a violation
of his rights guaranteed by the FLSA. 101 When Epic moved to dismiss the
claim, Lewis asserted that the arbitration agreement violated Section 7 of the
NLRA as it prevented employees from filing concerted actions, and thereby
could not be upheld. 102
The court found that an analysis of the statutory language of Section 7 of
the NLRA103 was necessary to determine whether Epic’s individual
arbitration policy could co-exist with the rules of the statute.104 The NLRB,
as well as certain courts, had established that the right to bring a class action
lawsuit constitutes a “concerted activity.” 105 For example, in Altex Ready
Mixed Concrete Corp. v. NLRB, 106 the Fifth Circuit provided that “[a] lawsuit
filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms
or conditions of employment is a ‘concerted activity’ under §7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.” 107 The Seventh Circuit found that both the history and
purpose of Section 7 support this notion and reinforce an employee’s right to
bring a class action suit. 108 In beginning to scrutinize the statutory language,
the court must consider whether any ambiguity exists by applying the
ordinary definitions of each of the words to their usage in the statute.109 The
traditional definition of the word “concerted” is “jointly arranged, planned,
or carried out . . . .” 110 Further, “activities” are “thing[s] that a person or group
does or has done,” or “actions taken by a group in order to achieve their

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
As noted previously, the language in Section 7 provides that “[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C § 157 (2012); see Epic Sys. Corp.,
823 F.3d at 1151.
104. See Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d at 1152.
105. See id. at 1151.
106. See generally Altex Ready Mixed Corp. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976).
107. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d at 1152; see generally Altex, 542 F.2d at 295.
108. See Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d at 1152.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 1153.
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aims.” 111 Thus, from the plain meaning of these words, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that it was unambiguous that a class action proceeding cohesively
fits into the definition of a “concerted activity.” 112
Moreover, the congressional intent to classify class action lawsuits as a
“concerted activity” under Section 7 of the NLRA is further supported by the
notion that Congress intended for a broad interpretation of said phrase to
encompass class action proceedings. 113 Prior to enacting the NLRA,
Congress acknowledged that “a single employee was helpless in dealing with
an employer,” and “that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on an equality with their employer.” 114 Congress’s primary concern in
enacting the NLRA was “to equalize the bargaining power of the employee
with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together in
confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of their
employment.” 115 Considering that class action lawsuits allow employees to
“band together” and “equalize bargaining power,” the only plausible
conclusion is that Congress intended to permit and protect them, and that no
ambiguity exists. 116
Even if one accepts Epic’s argument that Section 7 is ambiguous, the
NLRB has interpreted both Section 7 and Section 8 as preventing employers
from contracting class action litigation out of the terms of their agreements
with employees. 117 With that said, the statutory language of Section 7 is
unambiguous; however, assuming for a moment that it is in fact ambiguous,
it is nevertheless given judicial deference according to the rule promulgated
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 118 The
Chevron case established a two-part test regarding the interpretation of
statutes. 119 The first part of the test asks whether the statute yields
ambiguity. 120 In considering whether a statute is ambiguous, several factors
are considered, such as the language of the statute, as well as the
congressional intention in enacting it. 121 If it is found that a statute is, in fact,
ambiguous, the second prong of the Chevron test explains that controlling
weight should be given to an agency’s interpretation of the statute, unless
such legislative regulations “are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
See id.
See id.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); see also Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d at 1153.
115. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984); see also Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d at 1153.
116. See Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d at 1153.
117. See id.
118. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
119. See id. at 844.
120. See id.
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to the statute.” 122 Thus, so long as the NLRB’s interpretation is not “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” it deserves the necessary
deference and recognition that Chevron calls for. 123
Applying the statutory interpretation and intent to the facts of Epic, one
of the essential issues presented before the Seventh Circuit is whether Epic’s
arbitration policy encroaches on an employee’s Section 7 NLRA rights, and
the Seventh Circuit found that it did. 124 In sum, the contract between Epic
and its employees stated that disputes arising over wages and hours had to be
sorted out by means of arbitration, preventing employees from collectively
litigating their claims. 125 Thus, it is facially apparent that the second portion
of Epic’s contractual provision fiercely clashes with Section 7. In addition,
Section 8 of the NLRA 126 comes into play at this time, invalidating actions
implemented by an employer that directly conflict with the rights granted to
an employee in Section 7. 127 Therefore, in light of all considerations taken
collectively, the Seventh Circuit supports the assertion of this Note, in
holding that Epic’s arbitration agreement violated both Section 7 and Section
8 of the NLRA, and was therefore unenforceable. 128
B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
In D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 Horton, an employer, required his
employees to sign waivers upon beginning their employment, and three
aspects of the waivers are the focal point of this case: (1) providing that
employees “voluntarily waive all rights to trial in courts before a judge on all
claims between them;” (2) “all disputes and claims” would “be determined
exclusively by final and binding arbitration,” including claims for “wages,
benefits, or other compensation;” and (3) “the arbitrator [would] not have the
authority to consolidate the claims of other employees,” and would “not have
the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action, or to
award relief to a group or class of employees in one arbitration
proceeding.” 130 To summarize, Horton prohibited his employees from
bringing concerted actions by means of arbitration. 131 In January of 2012, the
NLRB held that the arbitration agreement violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (4)
of the NLRA, which bestows upon employees a right to pursue concerted
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
See id.
See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir. 2016).
See id. at 1155.
As mentioned previously, Section 8 states that any employer action that “interfere[s] with,
restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7]” constitutes
an “unfair labor practice.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
127. See Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d at 1155.
128. See id. at 1156.
129. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348, 364 (5th Cir. 2013).
130. Id. at 348.
131. See id.
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legal action. 132 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, and held that the Board
did not give necessary deference to the FAA,133 enacted by Congress to
“provide[] the legislative framework for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards in the United States.” 134
The NLRB’s holding on this matter coincides with the holding of the
Seventh Circuit. 135 Therefore, an analysis of why the NLRB’s decision on
this matter was correct will allow one to effectively understand why the Fifth
Circuit’s reversal was arguably improper. 136 Here, the NLRB and the Fifth
Circuit clash over whether the FAA is impervious, whereby the NLRB says
it is not, and the Fifth Circuit says that the FAA reigns supreme over all other
federal statutes post-dating it. 137 The Fifth Circuit’s assumption is incorrect.
The answer lies in understanding that it is unnecessary to assess whether the
FAA trumps the NLRA, because the two statutes do not conflict with one
another at all, and unbeknownst to the Fifth Circuit, there is “statutory room”
for the two to peacefully coexist. 138
An understanding of the FAA’s “Saving’s Clause” is necessary in order
to recognize the possibility of peaceful cohesion between the FAA and the
NLRA. 139 Though part of the FAA provides for the enforcement of any
written contract to arbitrate, the “Saving’s Clause” in Section 2 of the FAA,
entitled, “Validity, Irrevocability, and Enforcement in Agreements to
Arbitrate,” states that,
A written provision in any . . . agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. 140

Given what we know about Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA (the right to
pursue concerted legal action), if an employer’s arbitration clause prohibits
collective action amongst employees, an initial conflict results between the
FAA’s clause, mentioned above, and the NLRA. However, the conflict soon
dissipates because Section 2 of the FAA provides a solution. 141 “[S]ave upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity,” means that the FAA will invalidate
an arbitration agreement, should the agreement impinge on a right granted to
an employee under other federal legislation. 142 In other words, an arbitration

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 349; see also Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 63, at 1015, 1030.
See D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 348.
Salomon & de Villiers, supra note 62.
See generally Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
See generally Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 63.
See id. at 1015.
See Lareau, supra note 1.
See id.
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agreement between an employer and an employee becomes illegal once it
denies an employee his or her right to engage in concerted activities.
Through this analysis, the NLRB clearly exemplified a simple way for
the FAA and the NLRA to cohabitate, and arguably invalidated the Fifth
Circuit’s rationale that the FAA is essentially the supreme law of the
arbitration land. 143 Finally, it is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit recognized
the power of the NLRB’s holding. 144 Specifically, the court stated, “[w]e add
that we are loath to create a circuit split. Every one of our sister circuits to
consider the issue has either suggested or expressly stated that they would
not defer to the NLRB’s rationale, and held arbitration agreements containing
class waivers enforceable.” 145 This notion sheds light on the length that a
court will go to keep its opinion consistent with that of other courts, absent
any blatantly unfounded or unjustified holding. Although the Fifth Circuit
did not side with the holding of the NLRB, it nevertheless recognized the
strength of the Board’s argument, and did not outwardly dismiss its
reasoning. Thus, the NLRB, through the analysis of the FAA’s “Saving’s
Clause,” allows one to further understand why there is no need to establish
an inconsistency between the FAA and the NLRA, and continues to
strengthen the Seventh Circuit’s holding and rationale.
C. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Next, in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 146 Bristol Care appealed from a
decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, which denied its motion to compel arbitration in a suit brought by
its former employee. 147 The subject employee, by means of the FLSA,
wanted to initiate a class action lawsuit on behalf of other employees who
were in a similar situation.148 Bristol Care hired plaintiff as an administrator
at one of its residential care facilities in Missouri in 2009. 149 Upon his hiring,
plaintiff signed an agreement providing for
binding arbitration of all claims or controversies for which a federal or state
court or other dispute-resolving body otherwise would be authorized to
grant relief whether arising out of, relating to or associated with . . . any . .
. legal theory that Employee may have against the Company or that the
Company may have against the Employee. 150
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Additionally, among other provisions that were included, there was a
waiver that prevented the parties “from arbitrating claims subject to [the]
Agreement as, or on behalf of, a class.” 151
Plaintiff brought this class action suit against Bristol Care in September
2011, claiming that Bristol Care intentionally misclassified him and other
similarly situated employees to prevent them from receiving overtime pay. 152
Relying on D.R. Horton, Bristol Care argued that nothing in the FLSA
indicates the barring of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. 153 The
Eighth Circuit reversed the holding of the district court, finding that the
employee did not point to anything in either the text of the FLSA or in the
legislative history to prove that Congress intended to bar employees from
agreeing to arbitrate FLSA claims individually, and further, the court found
that the FLSA and the FAA could cohesively exist amongst one another,
without causing any friction. 154
The Supreme Court has repeatedly taken a liberal position in favor of
arbitration agreements, requiring that courts uphold the terms of an
arbitration agreement in a contract absent any “contrary congressional
command” of another statute that would override the federal superiority of
the FAA. 155 One would not be required to search for such a “contrary
congressional command,” as it would be evident in the text of the statute, or
in its legislative history. 156 Thus, the burden of proving that Congress has, in
fact, intended to restrict the use of arbitration in any of its legislation is on
the party seeking to invalidate the arbitration agreement from their contract
(in this case, the burden of proof was on plaintiff). 157 Therefore, in an attempt
to prove that the FLSA does in fact contain a “contrary congressional
command,” the plaintiff looked to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, as this section
recognizes “[t]he right . . . to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee,
and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to such any
action.” 158 The Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, finding that
the provision was not strong enough to render a “contrary congressional
command,” because the FLSA also states that “[n]o employee shall be a party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing.” 159 The
rationale was that if an employee must provide written consent in order to
involve him or herself in a class action suit, then they should also have the
power to waive such participation. 160
151.
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After the textual analysis was not accepted by the Eighth Circuit, the
plaintiff next looked to the legislative history of the NLRA to demonstrate
congressional intent to override the FAA. 161 Specifically, the plaintiff
referenced statements that were made during the passage of the NLRA in
1935, arguing that the purpose of the Act is “to secure for employees the full
right to act collectively to ensure that employers and employees should
possess equality of bargaining power.” 162 Additionally, the plaintiff pointed
to the congressional intent of the NLRA to expand the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
passed three years before the NLRA, to “prevent employers from imposing
contracts on employees that would require employees to forgo engaging in
collective actions.” 163 This legislative history of the NLRA, according to the
plaintiff, rendered the conclusion that Congress had undoubtedly intended to
protect employees from having to agree to arbitrate claims individually. 164
Once again, the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the
FAA was reenacted in 1947, which was twelve years after the passage of the
NLRA, fifteen years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and nine years after the
enactment of the FLSA in 1938. 165 The court interpreted this reenactment to
mean that Congress intended for its arbitration protections to remain
unscathed, notwithstanding the prior passage of these three major pieces of
legislation. 166 Importantly, Eighth Circuit Judge Gruender acknowledged the
consistency of this circuit’s opinion with all other courts of appeals that have
been presented with this issue, that is, that arbitration agreements containing
class action waivers are permitted by major labor relations statutes. 167 One
could argue, as in D.R. Horton, Inc., 168 that even though it was not the driving
force of the opinion of the court, there was hesitation to create a circuit split,
and this factor certainly played a role in the outcome of this case. This
disinclination suggests that courts do, in fact, appreciate the holding of the
NLRB in D.R. Horton, Inc., and that the court might have given greater
deference to the NLRB’s stance, had the issue of a circuit split not been on
the horizon.
D. THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Further, in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 169 the issue presented was
whether an employee could abrogate a class-action waiver provision in the
arbitration agreement she signed upon beginning employment, when, absent
161.
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the waiver, she was left without an impetus to file a claim under the FLSA. 170
Plaintiff Sutherland worked for Ernst & Young as an audit employee from
September 2008 to December 2009. 171 Sutherland received an annual salary
of $55,000 and was not entitled to overtime pay for working more than a
forty-hour workweek. 172 According to Sutherland, she often worked
anywhere between 45–50 hours per week, and therefore, had it not been for
her title as a “salary only” employee, she would have been entitled to
overtime. 173 Upon beginning her employment with Ernst & Young,
Sutherland signed an offer letter, which contained two important arbitration
provisions: (1) “Neither the Firm nor an Employee will be able to sue in court
in connection with a Covered Dispute,” and (2) “Covered Disputes pertaining
to different [e]mployees will be heard in separate proceedings.” 174
Notwithstanding the terms of her agreement with Ernst & Young, Sutherland
filed a class action suit to recover 151.5 hours of overtime work that she did
not receive compensation for, which, amounted to more than $1,500. 175
Ernst & Young filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that as per the terms of
the arbitration agreement, not only was plaintiff barred from bringing her
claim in court, but additionally, she was not permitted to bring a class action
suit against Ernst & Young, as all claims required individuality. 176 In
response, plaintiff alleged that the arbitration agreement in its entirety was
invalid, because compelling plaintiff to solely raise a claim on an individual
basis was contrary to the protection she was entitled to under the FLSA. 177
Specifically, she contended that the costs accompanied by an individual
claim would far surpass the amount in controversy, thereby eliminating any
financial incentive to bring this action. 178
Ultimately, on appeal, the Second Circuit held that the FLSA did not
include anything that prohibited the enforcement of a class-action waiver
provision in an arbitration agreement, and that the expense of an individual
claim was not enough to invalidate a class-action waiver. 179 Much of the
Court’s rationale stemmed directly from the Eighth Circuit’s holding in
Owen, thereby referencing the deference that each circuit court accords one
another on a case-by-case basis. 180 Similar to Owen, the Second Circuit began
with an assertion that the FLSA does not contain a “contrary congressional
command,” which would allude to the invalidation of an arbitration
170.
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agreement. 181 The plaintiff in Sutherland, in an attempt to reply to this
argument, contended that as per Section 216(b) of the FLSA, “[a]n action to
recover the liability . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . in any
Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves or other employees
similarly situated.” 182 Just as the Eighth Circuit had done in Owen, the
Second Circuit pointed to Section 216(b) 183 to negate plaintiff’s argument,
and quoted the following from the Owen decision: “[e]ven assuming
Congress intended to create some right to class actions, if an employee must
affirmatively opt in to any such class action, surely the employee has the
power to waive participation in a class action as well.” 184
In the second part of the holding, the Second Circuit concluded that Ernst
& Young’s arbitration agreement, requiring Sutherland to raise any and all
claims on an individual basis, did not prevent her from “effectively
vindicating” her rights, a protection guaranteed to her under the FLSA. 185
Though Sutherland contended that individual arbitration was exceedingly
expensive, the Court, citing Italian Colors, found that although the “effective
vindication doctrine” is raised when attempting to quash “a provision in an
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights . . .
the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” 186 In
other words, nothing was statutorily preventing plaintiff from individually
arguing this claim by means of arbitration, aside from her own
discouragement of embarking on such an uphill financial battle. While it is
likely that many other individuals would not have brought this claim
individually due to the financial burden it would yield, the Second Circuit
would surely hold that this argument was not strong enough to invalidate the
arbitration agreement. 187
The holdings and rationales of each court stem from their individualized
determinations of whether the FAA and NLRA are capable of cohesive
existence. It has been established that the circuits that do not accept the
concept of cohesion between the two statutes—the Fifth, Second, and Eighth
Circuits—have upheld class action waivers in arbitration agreements as
legally enforceable. 188 To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit—the sole court
181. See id. at 296.
182. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012)).
183. “No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in
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1052–53 (8th Cir. 2013).
185. See Ernst & Young, 726 F.3d at 298.
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that allows for statutory coexistence—has refused to recognize the validity
of such an agreement. 189 The crux of the disagreement derives from the
FAA’s “Saving’s Clause,” which, as has been analyzed extensively
throughout the course of this Note, provides a light at the end of the tunnel
for statutory coexistence between the NLRA and the FAA. Importantly, the
Seventh Circuit’s finding of statutory cohesion should not be taken lightly,
because according to Chevron, great deference is to be afforded to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute, so long as said interpretation is not
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 190 Thus, the
ability of the Seventh Circuit to provide for the FAA and NLRA to stand
separate and distinct from one another should be recognized and adhered to.
V. NOW WHAT? SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION
PRACTICES
Many large companies that implement mandatory arbitration agreements
into their contracts also maintain “internal dispute-resolution” practices in an
attempt to resolve conflicts prior to a claim having to reach the arbitration
phase. 191 A federal statute requiring the implementation of said practices in
all companies that enforce arbitration agreements would be extremely
beneficial to employees, and would vastly reduce the amount of claims that
would result in arbitration. This internal dispute-resolution practice would
serve as a compromise between employers and employees because it would
encourage conflicts to reach settlements and agreements “in-house.”
Although this solution would not alleviate all of the issues associated
with arbitration, such as the issue of proper notice to employees or
consumers, these types of procedures have found great success in
corporations that have implemented them. 192 One of these American
companies is Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., a brewing company based in
St. Louis. 193 Although Anheuser-Busch does indeed require employees to
sign mandatory arbitration agreements, before coming anywhere near actual
arbitration of a claim, the company’s local management first steps in and
assesses the complaint, followed by the mediation of any claims. 194 A study
conducted by Bales and Plowman proved that this system provides great
success in avoiding arbitration; the study found that from 2003–2006, 95%
of claims were resolved at the local management phase. 195 Further, regarding
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the actions that made it to the second phase—the mediation phase—seventytwo of the eighty-seven total claims (or 83%) were settled. 196 This means that
under this internal dispute-resolution system, only 1% of cases reached the
arbitration phase. 197 Naturally, this proposed solution would not completely
relieve any and all negative feelings employees may have towards arbitration
agreements, as the fear of, for example, effective notice, would still remain a
grave trepidation for employees. 198 Needless to say, however, if all
corporations were required to implement internal dispute-resolution
practices, one would surmise that these companies could yield similar results
to those of Anheuser-Busch, and the amount of disputes that actually reached
the arbitration phase would significantly decrease.
Another example of a company with an even more extensive internal
dispute-resolution initiative is TRW, an automotive manufacturing
company. 199 Features of TRW’s internal dispute-resolution measures consist
of mediation, local management complaint procedures, and peer review
panels, whereby similarly-established employees at the company will take on
the form of a jury and decide complaints that they are presented with. 200 As
with Anheuser-Busch, the amount of complaints that reached the arbitration
phase at TRW was extremely minimal. 201 Within the first three years of the
company’s initiative, only seventy-two cases reached the mediation phase
(which followed both the management complaint procedures and the peer
review panels), and only three cases in total reached arbitration. 202
Additionally, as if these procedures were not already worthy of applause on
TRW’s behalf, in the rare occurrence that a case did, in fact, reach arbitration,
the company went so far as to render such arbitration decisions binding on
the company if the company were to have lost, and not binding on the
employee, should the company win. 203 To clarify, this meant that should an
employee lose at arbitration, the employee maintained a right to bring the
action to court. 204 Obviously, these internal dispute-resolution procedures,
though extremely employee-friendly, are few and far between, as there are
not many companies that duplicate such favorable terms in the contracts with
their employees; however, both of these companies’ “in-house” procedures
shed light on the need for all companies to have at least some form of
initiative to decrease the amount of claims that reach the arbitration phase. 205
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One could argue that a counterargument to this proposed suggestion is
that these “in-house” internal dispute practices and procedures might still
result in unfriendly employee practices, because too much leverage would be
given to the company in determining the destiny of the dispute. For example,
the members of the “in-house” mediation team might feel pressure to give
unnecessary deference to the company in analyzing disputes, because after
all, these individuals are also employees of the company. Thus, a legitimate
fear of employer retaliation arises, should the mediation team, or any other
“in-house” internal dispute-resolution group decide in favor of the employee,
and against the company. In light of this concern, companies should also form
an independent internal dispute-resolution committee, comprised of
individuals who do not work for the company. This heightened suggestion is
helpful in that it is extremely likely to continue to reduce the number of cases
that reach the arbitration phase of litigation while at the same time
maintaining an unbiased opinion about the circumstances surrounding the
dispute.
In sum, to create a more fluid and comprehensive set of requirements for
companies to follow in the future, companies that compel class action
waivers in arbitration agreements should implement a two-tier internaldispute resolution system to reduce the number of actions that actually reach
the arbitration phase. The first is to create an independent team of
managers—untainted and distinct from the internal management of the
company—who would first review the employee’s claim and analyze its
legitimacy. If this team of independent managers determines that the
employee’s claim is in fact justifiable, step two of the internal-dispute
resolution would then be triggered. The second step is the creation of an
internal independent mediation team. This team would attempt to settle the
claim and assist in reaching an appropriate solution prior to the action
reaching arbitration. This two-tier internal-dispute resolution system would
likely yield similar success in comparison to companies that already have
similar systems in place.
B. AMENDING THE FAA TO MORE ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
Another proposed solution is for Congress to amend the FAA, as this
would solve the potential predicament of the preemption of state legislation
on the matter. 206 One possibility is for Congress to extend the protection that
employers receive within the realm of arbitration. 207 An attempt at this has
already been made through the proposal of the Arbitration Fairness Act
(AFA). 208 Had the AFA been enacted, the FAA would have been amended to
206. See id. at 25.
207. See id.
208. See id.
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include that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer
dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.” 209 By means of this
proposal, the AFA would have disposed of obligatory arbitration agreements
in any of the disputes in the areas mentioned in the clause above.210 The AFA
has arguably been proposed with employees and consumers specifically in
mind, as Congress has previously commented on the lack of choice
employees and consumers have in regards to entering into a mandatory
arbitration agreement. 211 Importantly, the AFA was first proposed in 2009,
and several versions have since been proposed, with a more recent proposal
initiated by Senator Al Franken and Representative Hank Johnson in 2015. 212
Though it appears doubtful that Congress would presently pass the AFA, the
mere fact that the proposal has been at the forefront of discussion for over
approximately six years speaks to the importance of this issue, and the dire
need for greater employee protection against arbitration. 213
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit took the initial step of straying from the decision of
not one, but three United States Circuit Courts on the contested issue of class
action waivers in arbitration agreements. This Note has argued that with the
Seventh Circuit’s most recent decision, a circuit court has finally decided on
this issue correctly, as these mandatory waivers violate Section 7 and Section
8 of the NLRA, as well as the FLSA. Further, contrary to the holdings of the
Fifth, Second, and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit’s holding neither
conflicts with the interpretation of the FAA, nor does it disturb the cohesion
of the FAA and the NLRA, as the analysis of the FAA’s “Saving’s Clause”
in this Note rebuts any argument of incompatibility between the two pieces
of legislation. Naturally, though extremely influential, none of these circuit
court holdings are black-letter law; thus, there is a critical need for federal
guidance, to not only protect the rights of an employee, but to settle the matter
once and for all.
Although granting federal protection to employees in this situation would
rock the corporate world, companies have been successful in implementing
alternative internal dispute-resolution procedures that have prevented a
dispute from undergoing immediate arbitration. This proves that these
waivers are not the only means by which an employer can effectively settle
claims outside of court, as this Note has suggested alternative routes for
Congress: enacting a statute requiring the creation of internal dispute
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departments within all companies, or amending the FAA to properly address
the rights of employees in these circumstances. Nonetheless, it is clear that
without some sort of federal guidance, this fiercely contested issue will
remain at the forefront of our judicial system for quite some time, with
continued uncertainty circulating the corporate arbitration realm.
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